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“For the bears, low rates are a sign of the desperation of central bankers, and an indication that 
economic growth will be subdued for some time to come.” (The Economist, 18/09/2010) 
 
1.  Introduction 
The financial crisis that commenced in late 2007 has been global in nature and of an 
unprecedented magnitude, as compared to previous episodes of financial turmoil. It has led to 
historically low interest rates in most advanced economies. In the United States (US), the Federal 
Funds rate (FFR) reached the zero lower bound in December 2008 and subsequently the Fed 
adopted a non-conventional monetary policy. The relationship between monetary policy and 
stock market performance has been extensively studied in the previous literature using a variety 
of empirical approaches, ranging from vector autoregressive models to event studies (see e.g. 
Cook and Hahn, 1989; Jensen and Johnson, 1995; Thorbecke, 1997; Bernanke and Kuttner, 
2005). Previous studies on the US stock market, have widely documented a positive reaction to 
expansionary monetary policy surprises and state dependence, with the aforementioned reaction 
being stronger during ‘bad times’ of negative economic growth and deteriorating financial 
conditions (see e.g. Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2010).  
Nevertheless, these studies focus on the pre-crisis period and therefore an important 
question is naturally raised regarding the nature of the relationship between monetary policy and 
stock market performance during the financial crisis.  It is not clear, a priori, how stock market 
participants will react to interest rate cuts when uncertainty in the macro-financial environment is 
heightened and monetary policy moves closer to the zero lower bound. In fact, since the onset of 
the credit crunch and up until early 2009, stock market investors have faced falling stock prices 
 - 3 - 
together with sharp cuts in interest rates, indicating that the inverse relationship between interest 
rates and stock market valuation has weakened.  
Since anticipated policy actions should have already been incorporated in to stock market 
participants’ investment decisions, in line with market efficiency arguments, most of the 
previous studies focus on the reaction of stock returns to the unexpected component of interest 
rate changes. In agreement with these studies, we adopt an event study approach and use the 
methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001) to calculate monetary policy shocks using daily data 
from FFR futures contracts. These contracts provide real-time information about investors’ 
expectations regarding future interest rates. As noted in previous research, endogeneity may 
impose potential econometric problems since monetary policy can be itself reacting to stock 
market developments (see Rigobon and Sack, 2003). Nevertheless, the problem of endogeneity 
in the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance  should be less potent 
when higher frequency data, such as daily data, are used within an event study framework (see 
e.g. Bredin et al., 2009; Chen, 2007; Kurov, 2010).  
In this paper we investigate the impact of FFR surprises on US stock returns over the 
period 1989-2009. As far as we are aware this is the first such paper to analyse data from both 
the recent financial crisis and the pre-crisis periods. Our results can be summarised as follows. 
First, in line with previous literature, we find that prior to the recent financial crisis, stock prices 
increased as a response to expansionary monetary policy surprises, with an unexpected 1% cut in 
the FFR being associated with almost a 4% increase in the S&P 500 index. Second, we find that 
during the pre-crisis period there was state dependence of similar nature to that identified in 
previous studies. In particular, stock prices exhibited larger increases when interest rate easing 
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occurred during ‘bad times’ of recession, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market 
conditions, indicating asymmetries in the stock market response to monetary policy.  
Third, and most importantly, we show that a structural break took place during the 
financial crisis period, altering the stock market response to FFR shocks, as well as the nature of 
state dependence with respect to ‘good times’ versus ‘bad times’. Specifically, we find that 
during the crisis period, stock market participants did not react positively to expansionary FFR 
surprises. In fact, some of our estimates indicate that there was a statistically significant negative 
stock market response to the large FFR cuts that took place throughout the financial crisis. The 
lack of a positive response to expansionary FFR shocks between 2007-2009, a period 
characterised by sharply deteriorating macro-financial conditions and monetary policy operating 
close to the zero lower bound, suggests that the type of asymmetric behaviour identified in the 
previous literature for the pre-crisis period, did not materialise during the recent crisis.  Our 
results highlight the severity of the 2007-2009 crisis, reveal the limits of conventional monetary 
policy at the zero lower bound and are consistent with the Keynesian liquidity trap theory.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset. 
Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and stylised facts 
In this section we analyse the effects of 189 FOMC target rate decisions between June 
1989 and December 2009. 1 As Bernanke and Mihov (1998), among others, point out, the FFR 
                                                 
1 In agreement with most of the previous studies we exclude from our analysis the 17 September 2001 target rate 
announcement, which took place on the first trading day following the 11 September terrorist attacks (see e.g. 
Jansen and Tsai, 2010). 
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has been the key policy instrument in the US and therefore unexpected changes in this rate 
should provide good estimates of policy shocks. Following Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) we use data from FFR futures contracts in order to derive the unexpected 
component of the FFR change. While the FFR is a good proxy of monetary policy stance in 
relatively ‘normal’ periods (see e.g. Wright, 2011), the last two years of our sample (2007-2009) 
are quite exceptional. They are marked by the global financial crisis and the use of 
unconventional policies by the Fed since late 2008, when the zero lower bound for nominal 
interest rates was reached and the Fed replaced the FFR with its balance sheet as its primary 
policy instrument.2 
As Wright (2011, p.4) argues, “...things are murkier at the zero bound...[and]...there isn’t 
as clean a single measure of the overall stance of unconventional monetary policy”. Furthermore, 
unlike information provided by FFR futures contracts, there are no direct real-time measures of 
investors’ expectations regarding the size of asset purchases.  Hence, we use FFR shocks as the 
principal explanatory term in our empirical analysis, keeping in mind that they can be clearly 
identified as monetary policy shocks throughout most of the sample period, and will not attempt 
to measure shocks in unconventional policies.3 
                                                 
2 Quantitative easing (QE) involves altering the Fed’s balance sheet composition through significant financial asset 
purchases in order to support credit markets and to provide economic stimulus. Furthermore, the Fed issued press-
release statements signalling that the FFR will be kept at the zero bound for a sustained period of time.  
3 Rosa (2012) identifies the surprise component of asset purchases by the Fed using a methodology based upon 
interpreting the wording of related articles in the Financial Times. As he points out, though, the estimates of the 
response of US asset prices to his measure of unconventional policy shocks are surrounded by considerable 
statistical uncertainty and, overall, are not significantly different from the response to an unanticipated FFR cut.  
 - 6 - 
In line with Basistha and Kurov (2008) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) among others, 
we utilise both scheduled (165) and unscheduled (24) FOMC meetings.4 On the day of the 
FOMC decision, the FFR shock, utiΔ , is measured by the change in the implied rate of the 
current-month FFR futures contract, as traded on the CBOT market, relative to the day before the 
FOMC announcement, scaled by a factor related to the number of days in the month affected by 
the change:   
( ), , 1ut m t m tDi f fD d −Δ = −− ,         (1) 
where utiΔ is the unexpected target rate change, ,m tf  is the current-month implied futures rate 
(100 minus the futures contract price), and D is the number of days in the month.5 We measure 
the expected interest rate change, etiΔ , as the actual change in the FFR target rate minus the 
surprise component: 
e u
t t ti i iΔ = Δ − Δ .          (2) 
 [TABLE 1 HERE] 
Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the 189 FOMC meetings in our dataset include 
83 changes in the FFR, 31 of which were contractionary ( 0tiΔ > ), while 52 were expansionary 
                                                 
4 Regarding the dating of the FOMC meetings, for the pre-February 1994 period, which was characterised by lack of 
press releases regarding FOMC decisions and ambiguity about the dates of open market operations, we use dates 
provided by Kuttner (2003). The FOMC started to explicitly announce rate changes on February 1994 in a move 
towards greater transparency and the corresponding dates are obtained from the Federal Reserve website at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2012monetary.htm 
5 This scaling adjustment is necessary because the futures contract’s settlement price is based upon the monthly 
average FFR. Following Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), unscaled changes in the 1-month futures rate are used to 
calculate the surprise component when the change takes place during the last three days of the month. 
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( 0)tiΔ < . The average interest rate change was equal to -0.05%, ranging from a minimum of         
-0.75% to a maximum of 0.75%. As shown in Figure 1, large interest rate surprises typically 
materialise during periods of monetary expansion and during economic deceleration and decline. 
Figure 2 plots the BAA-10 year US Treasury bond spread, with the shaded area showing periods 
where the credit spread exceeds its sample average.  These periods of higher credit risk typically 
overlap with recessionary episodes. A similar pattern emerges from Figure 3 which shows that 
periods of persistent stock market declines and worsening overall financial conditions tend to 
materialise during economic contractions. Figure 3 also highlights the severity of the recent 
financial crisis with the financial conditions index exhibiting an unprecedented decline.  
An important stylised fact which emerges from our preliminary analysis is that 
recessionary/high financial risk periods are associated with large unexpected FFR cuts. This fact 
will be taken into account in our econometric analysis since stock market participants may 
exhibit an alternative response to interest rate cuts when there is heightened macro-financial 
uncertainty and interest rates move closer to the zero lower bound.6    
[FIGURES 1-3 HERE] 
3. Econometric models and results 
3.1 Baseline analysis 
We begin our empirical investigation by regressing S&P 500 stock returns during FOMC 
                                                 
6 In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse in autumn 2008, risk aversion peaked and flight to safety trading 
saw a significant rebalancing of global investment portfolios, away from declining equities and towards government 
bonds. This led to a major decline in the US 10 year Treasury bond yield, from 4% in September 2008 to 2% in 
December 2008.  
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meeting dates on a constant and unexpected FFR changes 7: 
u
t t tr i eα β= + Δ + ,          (3) 
where stock returns, rt, are defined as the first difference of the natural log of the S&P 500 index 
(St) on close of the day of the FOMC meeting, relative to the previous trading day: 
1100*(ln ln )t t tr S S −= − .         (4) 
The OLS estimation results with Newey-West robust standard errors are presented in 
Table 2. The full sample results indicate that the stock market response to the surprise 
component of FFR changes is statistically insignificant.8 This finding is in contrast with the 
results from the previous literature. In fact, as shown in Table 2, utilising sample periods 
employed in previous research, which do not include the latest episode of financial crisis and 
recession, we obtain statistically significant estimates of the effect of monetary policy surprises. 
For example, using the sample period of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), i.e. June 1989 - 
December 2002, the estimate of the unexpected interest rate change is -4.22 and statistically 
                                                 
7 We also experimented with an alternative specification that includes both expected and unexpected FFR changes, 
in line with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). We found that the former variable tends to remain statistically 
insignificant both in the baseline regression and throughout most of the subsequent models we estimated (results 
available upon request). The finding of statistical insignificance of expected FFR changes can be interpreted as 
evidence consistent with stock market efficiency (see also Chulia et al., 2010). Following the majority of previous 
studies (see e.g. Kurov, 2010) we focused on models which include unexpected FFR changes only.  
8 Similar evidence is obtained when FOMC meetings coinciding with employment release dates and unscheduled 
meetings are removed from the sample. Furthermore, we removed outliers identified by the difference in fits statistic 
of Welsh and Kuh (1977) and the unexpected FFR change remains statistically insignificant. These results can be 
seen in Table A2 in the Appendix. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the dates associated with unscheduled 
meetings, employment information releases and outliers. 
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significant at the 5% level. 9 Hence, it appears the inclusion of the 2007-2009 financial crisis in 
the sample leads to statistically insignificant estimates of the FFR shock. This is consistent with 
previous evidence for the UK by Gregoriou et al. (2009). 
   [TABLE 2 HERE] 
3.2 Structural change during the financial crisis 
In this section we formally examine whether the full sample findings in Table 2 can be 
explained by structural instability in the stock market response to FFR surprises due to the 
impact of the global financial crisis. We date the start of the financial crisis at September 2007 
when the bank run at Northern Rock occurred, doubts regarding the stability of the global 
financial system emerged, and the the when first FFR cut (-0.5%) since 2003 occurred. Since the 
onset of the credit crunch on September 2007 and up until March 2009, stock market participants 
have experienced falling stock prices in tandem with sharp cuts in interest rates, thereby 
suggesting a weakening of the inverse relationship between interest rates and stock market 
valuation. Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, while the relationship between FFR surprises and stock 
returns during the pre-financial crisis period (June 1989 – August 2007) is negative (see Panel A), 
since September 2007 it ceases to be negative (see Panel B).10 Hence, it appears that interest rate 
                                                 
9 Note that our estimates in Table 2 using alternative sample periods are very similar but not always identical to 
those reported in the previous studies. The differences can be attributed to model specification issues regarding the 
inclusion (or not) of expected FFR changes. They may also be related to consideration (or not) of unscheduled 
FOMC meetings, and the meetings that coincide with employment data releases. 
10 A similar picture emerges when the unscheduled meeting of 22 January 2008, which was previously identified as 
an outlier, is excluded (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). That meeting led to a 0.75% cut in the FFR, the largest 
single cut since October 1984, which took the market fully by surprise (Δitu = -0.74%). The stock market reaction to 
the unexpected monetary policy easing was negative with the S&P 500 stock market index declining by 1.1%.  
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cuts during the financial crisis period were not perceived as good news by stock market 
investors.11 In fact, historically low interest rates may be seen as “a sign of the desperation of 
central bankers” (The Economist, 18/09/2010), and an indication that future profitability will be 
lower for some time, thereby signalling bad news for equities.  
[FIGURES 4-5 HERE] 
We proceed by interacting FFR surprises with a slope dummy variable which intends to 
capture a change in the relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks during the financial 
crisis:  
1 2[ (1 ) ]
crisis crisis u
t t t t tr D D i eα β β= + − + Δ + ,       (5) 
where Dtcrisis is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis period, and zero otherwise. In 
line with the previous discussion, we date the start of the financial crisis at September 2007 and 
the end of its most intense phase at March 2009, hence the narrow crisis dummy variable is equal 
to one between September 2007 - March 2009. We also consider a broader definition of the 
financial crisis period, whereby its end is dated at December 2009. 
   [TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 3 reports OLS estimates of Equation (5). Accounting for structural change in the 
impact of FFR surprises, leads to an increase in the adjusted R2, from 3% in the full sample no-
break results of Table 2 to 7% in Table 3 (see Panel A). Importantly, the stock market response 
to the unexpected FFR changes prior to the crisis period, as indicated by β1, is negative and 
statistically significant. During the pre-crisis period, an unexpected 25-basis-point cut in the FFR 
was associated with almost a 1% increase in the S&P index, a finding consistent with the 
                                                 
11 The last FFR cut took place in December 2008 (-0.75%) and the zero lower bound was reached (point II in Figure 
5). Since then, the FOMC used a target range for the FFR between 0% and 0.25%. 
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estimates of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), implying that unexpected interest rate easing was 
interpreted as a good signal by stock market participants. However, the estimated stock market 
response to FFR shocks during the crisis period, as indicated by β2, is no longer negative. The 
Wald test for equality of coefficients (H0: β1=β2) supports a statistically significant structural 
shift in the relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks. These findings are robust to the 
definition of the crisis dummy variable (broad versus narrow). 
In order to account for Bernanke and Kuttner’s (2005) argument that unexpected interest 
rate changes on days of employment data announcements may in fact reflect endogenous 
responses to the release of this information, in Table 3 Panel B we show results for nine FOMC 
meetings that coincide with employment data releases which are removed from the sample.12 The 
evidence in Panel B is similar to that in Panel A, which includes all FOMC meetings, identifying 
a negative and statistically significant impact of unexpected interest rate tightening on stock 
returns before the recent financial crisis, followed by an insignificant effect during the crisis 
period. Furthermore, excluding unscheduled FOMC meetings in Table 3 Panel C, leads to 
smaller and statistically insignificant estimates of the pre-crisis impact of FFR surprises and 
major deterioration in the fit of the model. This finding is consistent with previous evidence by 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Basistha and Kurov (2008) for the pre-crisis period.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 4 reports MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (5). MM 
estimates are robust in the presence of a large number of outliers (see also Kurov, 2010). The 
main difference between the OLS and MM results is that in the latter the coefficient of FFR 
surprises during the crisis period becomes statistically significant thereby implying a more 
                                                 
12 Furthermore, the stock market itself may be reacting to the employment data releases (see e.g. Boyd et al., 2005).  
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pronounced change in the nature of the relationship between interest rate changes and stock 
market performance. The positivity of β2 estimates indicates that since September 2007 
unexpected FFR cuts were perceived as bad news by stock market investors, thereby signifying a 
radical shift when compared to the pre-crisis positive stock market response to interest rate 
easing.  
The inability of the Fed to boost stock prices by expansionary interest rate cuts since 
September 2007 highlights the severity of the recent financial turmoil and reveals the limits of 
conventional interest rate policies close to the zero lower bound. The rebound in the S&P 500, 
which had declined by 65% since September 2007, and the decline in credit spreads did not 
occur until March 2009, when the Fed’s asset purchases were expanded, marking the end of the 
financial crisis’ most intense phase. Specifically, at the FOMC meeting of 18 March 2009, it was 
decided that the programme of QE, initiated in late 2008, would be augmented by adding 
mortgage-backed securities to the Fed’s balance sheet.13 This development can be justified in the 
light of previous empirical research on the effects of unconventional monetary policies. These 
studies typically identify a positive impact on economic activity, as well as a negative effect on 
financial market spreads and/or yields, from such unconventional policies (see e.g. Gambacorta 
et al., 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011; Wright, 2011). Hence, the stock market rebound at the 
                                                 
13 As Farmer (2012) argues, movements in mortgage-backed securities prices should be closely correlated with 
those in stock prices, since both asset classes tend to perform well when the economy recovers. Farmer (2012) points 
out that the stock price increases that commenced in March 2009, at the beginning of large-scale mortgage-backed 
securities purchases by the Fed, came to an abrupt stop in April 2010, when the first round of QE ended. 
Furthermore, the announcement of the second round of QE in August 2010 coincided closely with another major 
stock market reversal. 
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announcement of QE can be seen as reflecting expectations of an improved future macro-
financial environment. 
 
3.3 State dependence and the financial crisis 
Finding that interest rate cuts had no positive impact or even depressed stock prices 
during the recent financial crisis may seem as a surprising result, when seen in the light of 
previous studies, while at the same time ignoring the fact that monetary policy was operating 
close to and, after late 2008, at the zero lower bound. These studies typically identify a stronger 
stock market rebound when monetary expansion coincides with ‘bad times’ of negative 
economic growth, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market conditions (see e.g. Chen, 
2007; Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Jansen and Tsai, 2010; Kurov, 2010).14 Since the 2007-2009 
crisis was characterised by a credit crunch, an unprecedented deterioration in overall financial 
conditions and a major recession one would expect to find a strongly negative FFR shocks 
coefficient during that period. However, as we saw in Tables 3 and 4, the aforementioned 
coefficient is either insignificant or positive and significant. This suggests that an important 
structural shift has taken place in the nature of state dependence which characterises the stock 
market response to interest rate surprises.  
In order to ensure we obtain results consistent with the previous literature for the pre-
crisis period, we estimate Equation (6) which interacts FFR surprises with a slope interactive 
                                                 
14 Note that there are some studies that measure monetary policy surprises using survey data, rather than data on 
FFR futures as in this paper, and do not identify state dependence with respect to the state of the economy and credit 
market conditions (see e.g. Andersen et al., 2007). 
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variable that intends to capture state dependence in the relationship between stock returns and 
monetary policy shocks with respect to ‘good times’ versus ‘bad times’:  
1 2[ (1 ) ]
st st u
t t t t tr D D i eα β β= + − + Δ + ,        (6)           
where Dtst is defined as follows: (a) real time recession probability obtained from the dynamic-
factor markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008); (b) dummy variable equal to one 
when the BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, 
signifying high credit risk periods, and zero otherwise; (c) dummy variable equal to one when 
the S&P 500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3 year moving average, indicating a 
bear stock market regime, and zero otherwise.15  
   [TABLE 5 HERE] 
The MM weighted least squares estimates of Equation (6) in Table 5 show that, in 
agreement with the previous literature, during the pre-crisis period the impact of monetary policy 
surprises on stock returns is stronger during recessionary episodes, and periods of sustained stock 
price declines and worsening credit market conditions.16 More specifically, the estimated stock 
market response to interest rate shocks during ‘bad times’, as indicated by β2, is statistically 
significant and more negative as compared to the response during  ‘good times’, as indicated by 
β1. For example, excluding FOMC meetings which coincide with employment data releases, the 
results in Panel B show that prior to recent financial crisis, an unexpected 100-basis-point cut in 
the FFR was associated with almost a 9% increase in the S&P index during periods of high credit 
                                                 
15 While there is no commonly accepted definition in the literature, ours is consistent with, what Jansen and Tsai 
(2010) term as, the ‘common understanding’ of a bear stock market regime, that is, a period of significant and 
sustained stock price declines. 
16 Similar results, available upon request, are obtained with OLS estimation. 
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risk, while the corresponding increase was much smaller, around 2%, during periods of low 
credit risk. The Wald test for equality of the FFR shocks coefficient across ‘good times’ and ‘bad 
times’ typically rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Thus, the empirical 
results in Table 5 confirm the findings from previous studies on the pre-crisis period by 
identifying statistically and economically significant state dependence in the relationship 
between FFR shocks and stock market performance, in line with the credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission.  
 Finally, we estimate Equation (7) which interacts FFR surprises with both the state 
dependence slope variable (Dtst) and the crisis period dummy variable (Dtcrisis) in an effort to 
separate between the impact of FFR shocks during ‘good times’ and ‘bad times’ across the pre-
crisis and crisis periods: 
1 2 3 4[ (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ]
st crisis st crisis st crisis st crisis u
t t t t t t t t t t tr D D D D D D D D i eα β β β β= + − − + − + − + Δ + .      (7) 
The MM weighted least squares estimates of Equation (7) are shown in Table 6. 17 In line 
with the results in Table 5 they reveal that prior to the financial crisis the stock market response 
to FFR surprises during ‘bad times’ (β2) dominates its ‘good times’ counterpart (β1). The finding 
of state dependence is confirmed by the Wald test results (H0: β1=β2). The negativity of β2 
estimates reinforces the idea that prior to the crisis period expansionary interest rate shocks were 
seen as goods news by stock market participants. Nevertheless, an important structural shift 
occurred during 2007-2009 concerning the impact of FFR shocks during ‘bad times’. The Wald 
test results show that the null hypothesis β2=β4 is strongly rejected. The positivity and statistical 
significance of the β4 estimates reveal a negative stock market response to unexpected FFR cuts 
                                                 
17 Similar results, available upon request, are obtained with OLS estimation. 
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within a sharply deteriorating macro-financial environment.18 These findings remain consistent 
across all three panels in Table 6, thereby suggesting that our results are robust to the treatment 
of unscheduled FOMC meetings and those which coincided with employment data releases.  
   [TABLE 6 HERE] 
The empirical results in Table 6 are very enlightening and novel since not only do they 
confirm the findings of the pre-crisis literature, by identifying state dependence in the stock 
market response to FFR shocks, but at the same time reveal that an important structural break 
occurred in late 2007, affecting the nature of state dependence itself. Our results show that since 
September 2007 stock market participants did not react positively to expansionary FFR surprises, 
highlighting the severity of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The crisis was global in nature and of 
an order of magnitude significantly larger, as compared to previous episodes of recession and 
financial instability, led to a major flight to the perceived safety of Treasury bonds, which further 
depressed stock prices, and rendered conventional monetary policy ineffective.  
 
3.4 Further robustness checks 
We further examined the robustness of our findings in a number of ways.19 First, we 
experimented with alternative variables to capture state dependence with respect to ‘good times’ 
versus ‘bad times’ and found that the results remain quantitatively and qualitatively similar. 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that the crisis period is dominated by worsening financial conditions. Hence, the high credit risk 
and bear market dummy variables are active (equal to one) throughout most of the post September 2007 period.  
This implies that there are only a few instances where the interpretation of β3, as the 2007-2009 stock market 
response to FFR shocks during ‘good times’, makes sense. Due to the limited number of related observations the 
standard error of β3 is quite large. 
19 To save space these results are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Specifically, in order to proxy the state of the economy we used a dummy variable equal to one 
when there is a recession according to the NBER, while a dummy variable based upon the BAA-
AAA corporate bond spread was employed to measure credit market conditions (see also 
Basistha and Kurov, 2008). Moreover, we used an alternative proxy for bear market conditions, a 
dummy variable equal to one if the 3 year S&P 500 return is less than -20%. Finally, we trimmed 
from our sample period the last year (2009), that contained no interest rate changes since the zero 
lower bound was reached in December 2008, and obtained almost identical results with the 
sample period that extends until December 2009.   
 
4.  Conclusions 
 This paper investigates the impact of FFR surprises on US stock returns between 1989-
2009. We find that prior to the recent financial crisis, stock prices increased as a response to 
unexpected FFR cuts. Furthermore, in line with the previous literature, we identify state 
dependence during the pre-crisis period. Specifically, stock prices exhibited larger increases 
when interest rate easing coincided with ‘bad times’ of recession, bear stock markets, and 
tightening credit market conditions, thereby indicating asymmetries in the stock market reaction 
to FFR shocks. We also show, however, that an important structural shift took place in 
September 2007, at the onset of the financial crisis, changing the nature of state dependence. We 
find that during the crisis period stock market participants did not react positively to unexpected 
FFR cuts. Our results highlight the severity of the recent financial turmoil episode and the 
ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero lower bound for nominal 
interest rates. 
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Table A1: List of unscheduled meetings, employment releases and outlier dates 
 
Unscheduled Employment Outliers 
05-Jun-89   
 07-Jul-89  
26-Jul-89   
16-Oct-89  16-Oct-89 
06-Nov-89 06-Nov-89  
13-Jul-90   
29-Oct-90   
07-Dec-90 07-Dec-90  
08-Jan-91   
01-Feb-91 01-Feb-91  
08-Mar-91 08-Mar-91  
30-Apr-91   
06-Aug-91 06-Aug-91  
  21-Aug-91 
13-Sep-91   
31-Oct-91   
06-Dec-91 06-Dec-91  
20-Dec-91   
09-Apr-92   
 02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 
04-Sep-92 04-Sep-92  
  04-Feb-94 
18-Apr-94   
15-Oct-98  15-Oct-98 
03-Jan-01  03-Jan-01 
  20-Mar-01 
18-Apr-01  18-Apr-01 
  18-Sep-07 
22-Jan-08  22-Jan-08 
  18-Mar-08 
08-Oct-08   
    16-Dec-08 
 
Notes: In Table A1 outliers were identified using the difference in fits (DFITS) statistic.  
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Table A2: Response of stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, OLS 
 
 Obs α β Adj R
2 
Panel A (Excl Empl) 180 0.30*** -2.72 0.05 
  (0.10) (2.31)  
Panel B (Excl Empl & Unsch) 163 0.30*** -1.76 0.00 
  (0.11) (2.12)  
Panel C (Excl Outliers) 177 0.21** -0.98 0.00 
  (0.09) (0.94)  
 
Notes: Table A2 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation (3) over FOMC meeting dates: ut t tr i eα β= + Δ + . Δiu denotes unexpected FFR target rate changes. 
Sample period is June 1989 - December 2009. Obs indicate the number of relevant FOMC meetings. The 17 
September 2001 FOMC meeting is excluded in all Panels. Panel A excludes FOMC meetings on days with 
employment report releases. Panel B further excludes unscheduled FOMC meetings. Panel C excludes all FOMC 
meetings associated with outliers identified using the difference in fits (DFITS) statistic. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 - 23 - 
Figure A1: FFR unexpected change and stock returns during financial crisis and excluding 
22/01/2008 FOMC meeting 





















Notes: Figure A1 scatter plots the FFR unexpected change and S&P 500 daily returns on FOMC meeting dates using 
data covering the financial crisis period (September 2007 to December 2009) and excluding the FOMC meeting of 
22 January 2008.  The linear fit is the OLS regression line.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for FFR changes and unexpected changes 
 
 Obs Min Max Mean St.Dev 
All meetings      
Δi 189 -0.75 0.75 -0.05 0.23 
Δiu 189 -0.74 0.17 -0.03 0.10 
Contractionary     
Δi  > 0 31 0.25 0.75 0.30 0.12 
Δiu 31 -0.05 0.14 0.02 0.05 
 Expansionary     
Δi  < 0 52 -0.75 -0.25 -0.35 0.15 
Δiu 52 -0.74 0.17 -0.11 0.15 
No Change    
Δi  = 0 106 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Δiu 106 -0.20 0.12 -0.01 0.04 
 
Notes: Δi and Δiu denote FFR target rate changes and unexpected changes, respectively, on FOMC meeting dates 
over the period June 1989 - December 2009.  
 - 25 - 
 
Table 2: Response of stock returns to unexpected FFR changes across different sample 
periods, OLS estimates 
 
Sample Period Obs α β Adj R2 
Full Sample 189 0.28*** -2.07 0.03 
Jun-89 to Dec-09  (0.10) (1.90)  
     
Chulia et al. (2010) 80 0.21 -9.56*** 0.36 
May-97 to Oct-06  (0.14) (1.47)  
     
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 131 0.12 -4.22** 0.13 
Jun-89 to Dec-02  (0.12) (1.84)  
     
Kurov (2010) 137 0.15 -3.87** 0.11 
Feb-90 to Nov-04  (0.11) (1.85)  
 
Notes: Table 2 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation (3) over FOMC meeting dates: ut t tr i eα β= + Δ + . Δiu denotes unexpected FFR target rate changes. Obs 
indicate the number of FOMC meetings. The 17 September 2001 FOMC meeting is excluded. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Response of stock returns to unexpected FFR changes controlling for financial 
crisis, OLS estimates 
 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R
2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
Narrow Crisis 189 0.26** -3.76** 1.65 [0.02] 0.07 
  (0.10) (1.77) (1.50)   
Broad Crisis 189 0.26** -3.74** 1.61 [0.02] 0.07 
  (0.10) (1.77) (1.51)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
Narrow Crisis 180 0.28*** -5.33*** 1.68 [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.10) (1.78) (1.49)   
Broad Crisis 180 0.28*** -5.31*** 1.65 [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.10) (1.78) (1.51)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
Narrow Crisis 163 0.30*** -1.78 -1.63 [0.99] 0.00 
  (0.11) (1.51) (11.35)   
Broad Crisis 163 0.30*** -1.74 -1.89 [0.99] 0.00 
  (0.11) (1.51) (11.35)   
 
Notes: Table 3 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation (5) over FOMC meeting dates: 1 2[ (1 ) ]
crisis crisis u
t t t t tr D D i eα β β= + − + Δ + . Δiu denotes unexpected FFR 
target rate changes. Dtcrisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 during the crisis period (Narrow crisis: September 
2007 - March 2009; Broad crisis: September 2007 - December 2009), and 0 otherwise. Sample period is June 1989 - 
December 2009. Obs indicates the number of relevant FOMC meetings. Panel A includes all FOMC meetings with 
the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting. Panel B excludes FOMC meetings on days with employment 
report releases. Panel C further excludes unscheduled FOMC meetings. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values 
from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-statistic) in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Response of stock returns to unexpected FFR changes controlling for financial 
crisis, Robust MM estimates 
 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R
2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
Narrow Crisis 188 0.19*** -1.81** 2.09* [0.00] 0.03 
  (0.07) (0.83) (1.10)   
Broad Crisis 188 0.20*** -1.77** 2.05* [0.01] 0.03 
  (0.07) (0.83) (1.09)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
Narrow Crisis 179 0.19*** -3.91*** 2.09* [0.00] 0.10 
  (0.07) (0.93) (1.08)   
Broad Crisis 179 0.19*** -3.64*** 2.05* [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.07) (0.92) (1.05)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
Narrow Crisis 161 0.26*** -1.80 18.49*** [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.06) (1.19) (3.83)   
Broad Crisis 161 0.26*** -1.72 17.34*** [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.07) (1.21) (3.90)   
 
Notes: Table 4 reports Robust MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (6) over FOMC 
meeting dates: 1 2[ (1 ) ]
crisis crisis u
t t t t tr D D i eα β β= + − + Δ + . Δiu denotes unexpected FFR target rate changes. Dtcrisis 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 during the crisis period (Narrow crisis: September 2007 - March 2009; 
Broad crisis: September 2007 - December 2009), and 0 otherwise. Sample period is June 1989 - December 2009. 
Obs indicates the number of relevant FOMC meetings. Panel A includes all FOMC meetings with the exception of 
the 17 September 2001 meeting. Panel B excludes FOMC meetings on days with employment report releases. Panel 
C further excludes unscheduled FOMC meetings. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for 
equality of coefficients (F-statistic) in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Response of stock returns to unexpected FFR changes controlling for state-
dependence, pre-financial crisis, Robust MM estimates 
 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R
2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
(a) Prob. Recession 166 0.17** -1.90** 0.94 [0.35] 0.01 
  (0.06) (0.92) (2.66)   
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 168 0.17** -1.23 -6.90*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.07) (0.97) (1.16)   
(c) S&P Bear Market 167 0.17*** -0.82 -8.05*** [0.00] 0.16 
  (0.06) (0.82) (1.48)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
(a) Prob. Recession 159 0.15** -2.75*** -11.81*** [0.00] 0.18 
  (0.07) (1.05) (2.75)   
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 159 0.18*** -1.97* -8.57*** [0.00] 0.27 
  (0.07) (1.10) (1.13)   
(c) S&P Bear Market 158 0.17*** -2.10** -8.01*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.06) (0.99) (1.43)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
(a) Prob. Recession 144 0.20*** -0.79 -11.31** [0.06] 0.03 
  (0.06) (1.24) (5.06)   
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 144 0.21*** 0.41 -5.59*** [0.00] 0.05 
  (0.06) (1.35) (1.82)   
(c) S&P Bear Market 144 0.21*** -0.50 -6.82*** [0.02] 0.04 
  (0.06) (1.25) (2.46)   
 
Notes: Table 5 reports Robust MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (6) over FOMC 
meeting dates: 1 2[ (1 ) ]
st st u
t t t t tr D D i eα β β= + − + Δ + . Δiu denotes unexpected FFR target rate changes. Dtst is 
defined as follows: (a) real time recession probability obtained from the dynamic-factor markov-switching model of 
Chauvet and Piger (2008); (b) dummy variable equal to one when the BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread exceeds 
its full sample historical average, and zero otherwise; (c) dummy variable equal to one when the S&P 500 stock 
price index is lower than its full sample 3 year moving average, and zero otherwise. Sample period is June 1989 - 
August 2007. Obs indicates the number of relevant FOMC meetings. Panel A includes all FOMC meetings with the 
exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting. Panel B excludes FOMC meetings on days with employment report 
releases. Panel C further excludes unscheduled FOMC meetings.  Standard errors in parentheses. P-values from the 
Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-statistic) in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Response of stock returns to unexpected FFR changes controlling for financial crisis and state-dependence, Robust 
MM estimates 
 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 Adj R
2 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) Prob. Recession 185 0.21*** -1.82* 0.93 -11.19*** 34.58*** [0.39] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.16 
  (0.07) (0.97) (2.83) (2.76) (6.05)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 188 0.20*** -1.16 -7.06*** -18.44*** 2.50** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.20 
  (0.07) (1.03) (1.20) (5.74) (1.25)      
(c) S&P Bear Market 186 0.20*** -0.75 -8.08*** 5.91 2.25** [0.00] [0.62] [0.36] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.07) (0.87) (1.56) (7.27) (1.13)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) Prob. Recession 178 0.20*** -2.62** -11.92*** -11.27*** 34.74*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.27 
  (0.07) (1.09) (2.85) (2.71) (5.93)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 179 0.20*** -1.90 -8.77*** -18.41*** 2.42** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.28 
  (0.07) (1.18) (1.19) (5.51) (1.18)      
(c) S&P Bear Market 177 0.20*** -2.07** -8.06*** 5.97 2.21** [0.00] [0.60] [0.27] [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.07) (1.05) (1.54) (7.14) (1.11)      
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)            
(a) Prob. Recession 161 0.24*** -0.64 -12.08** -0.78 28.55*** [0.05] [0.08] [0.99] [0.00] 0.16 
  (0.06) (1.31) (5.46) (11.45) (6.84)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 162 0.26*** 0.62 -5.80*** -17.97*** 19.06*** [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.21 
  (0.06) (1.45) (1.97) (5.18) (3.82)      
(c) S&P Bear Market 161 0.24*** -0.38 -7.02*** 6.64 23.12*** [0.02] [0.04] [0.31] [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.06) (1.29) (2.53) (6.71) (4.10)      
 
Notes: Table 6 reports Robust MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (7) over FOMC meeting dates: 
1 2 3 4[ (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ]
st crisis st crisis st crisis st crisis u
t t t t t t t t t t tr D D D D D D D D i eα β β β β= + − − + − + − + Δ + . Δiu denotes unexpected FFR target rate changes. Dtst is 
defined as follows: (a) real time recession probability obtained from the dynamic-factor markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008); (b) dummy 
variable equal to one when the BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, and zero otherwise; (c) dummy variable equal to 
one when the S&P 500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3 year moving average, and zero otherwise. Dtcrisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 
during the crisis period (September 2007 - March 2009), and 0 otherwise. Sample period is June 1989 - December 2009. Obs indicates the number of relevant 
FOMC meetings. Panel A includes all FOMC meetings with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting. Panel B further excludes FOMC announcements 
on days with employment report releases. Panel C further excludes unscheduled FOMC meetings. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for 
equality of coefficients (F-statistic) in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Jun 1989 May 1991 Sep 1993 Nov 1996 Dec 1999 Dec 2002 Mar 2006 Mar 2009
FFR change FFF unexpected change Recession probability  
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the FFR change and FFR unexpected change on FOMC meeting dates over the period June 
1989 to December 2009. The shaded area is associated with NBER recession dates. The dotted line indicates the real 
time recession probability obtained from the dynamic-factor markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008).  
The recession probability data is available at: http://pages.uoregon.edu/jpiger/us_recession_probs.htm. 
 










Jun 1989 May 1991 Sep 1993 Nov 1996 Dec 1999 Dec 2002 Mar 2006 Mar 2009 
 
Notes: Figure 2 shows the spread between the Moody’s classified BAA corporate bond yield and the 10 year 
Treasury bond yield on FOMC meeting dates over the period June 1989 to December 2009. The shaded area is 
associated with FOMC meetings when the BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread exceeded its full sample historical 
average, indicating tightening credit market conditions. 
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Jun 1989 May 1991 Sep 1993 Nov 1996 Dec 1999 Dec 2002 Mar 2006 Mar 2009
S&P S&P (3YR MA) Financial Conditions Index  
 
Notes: Figure 3 shows the S&P 500 stock price index and its 3 year moving average (measured on left vertical axis) 
and the Bloomberg financial conditions index (measured on right vertical axis) on FOMC meeting dates over the 
period June 1989 to December 2009. A rise in the FCI is indicative of improving financial conditions.  The shaded 
area is associated with FOMC meetings when the S&P 500 index was below its full sample 3 year moving average 
indicating bear market conditions. 
 
Figure 4: FFR unexpected change and stock returns 








































Notes: Figure 4 scatter plots the FFR unexpected change and S&P 500 daily returns on FOMC meeting dates. Panel 
A uses data covering the pre-financial crisis period (June 1989 to August 2007). Panel B uses data covering the 
financial crisis period (September 2007 to December 2009). The linear fit is the OLS regression line.
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Notes: Figure 5 shows the S&P 500 stock price index (measured on left vertical axis) and the FFR (measured on the right vertical axis) over the period July 2007 
to December 2009. Point I marks the start of the financial crisis at September 2007. Point II corresponds to December 2008 when the last FFR cut (-0.75%) took 
place (16 December 2008) and the zero lower bound was reached. Point III marks the end of the financial crisis’ most intense phase at March 2009.   
